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As leading common law jurisdictions grapple with the Internet’s impact on defamation law,
comparative legal scholarship has revealed long-standing problems with its underlying
theoretical justifications. Specifically, public libel doctrine is commonly supported by appeals
to democratic theory in the abstract. Accountability concerns most relevant to adjudicating
public libel cases are thus routinely overlooked. This article aims to diagnose the causes
of these theoretical inaccuracies, describe their impact on public libel law, and translate
their significance for law reform. Through exploring eighteenth-century libertarian thought,
we highlight the foundational importance of accountability and the checking function
rationale to democratic theory and governance. An analysis of competing democratic models
demonstrates significant undertheorizing that poses several problems for contemporary
political speech and public interest defenses. This article suggests that, before proceeding
precipitously with Internet-inspired reforms, we might benefit from reflecting upon
defamation law’s impact on all aspects of our democratic values.
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AS JUDGES, LEGISLATORS, AND LEGAL SCHOLARS increasingly grapple with the

Internet’s impact on defamation law,1 comparative legal scholarship has uncovered
long-standing problems with its most fundamental of responsibilities.2 Namely,
efforts to balance political criticism and personal character in public libel cases
have been beset by widespread misuse of democratic free speech justifications.3
To be precise, courts and legislatures have defended their doctrinal approaches
1.

2.
3.

See e.g. Law Commission of Ontario, “Defamation Law in the Internet Age: Consultation
Paper” (Toronto: LCO, November 2017); Law Commission of Ontario, “Defamation Law
and the Internet: Where Do We Go From Here?” (Panel delivered at the Donald Lamont
Learning Centre, Law Society of Ontario, 3 May 2018) [unpublished]. Britain’s recent
reforms did not extend to the Internet. See e.g. UK, HC, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices
and Ethics of the Press (Cm 779), by the Right Honourable Lord Justice Leveson (London:
The Stationary Office, November 2012); Defamation Act 2013 (UK).
See Randall Stephenson, A Crisis of Democratic Accountability: Public Libel Law and the
Checking Function of the Press (Oxford: Hart, 2018).
Ibid. “Public libel” refers to the use of defamation law in cases involving defamatory
statements of fact on matters of public interest published to a mass audience, where the
plaintiff is a politician, public official, or influential public figure or corporation (ibid at 1).
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by appealing to democratic theory in the abstract, too often emphasizing its least
relevant features and overlooking the accountability concerns most applicable to
adjudicating public libel cases. Affecting the various political speech and public
interest defences endorsed since the US Supreme Court’s seminal judgment in
New York Times v Sullivan,4 this undertheorizing has compromised public libel
doctrine worldwide, resulting in arbitrary over- and under-protection of political
speech and expression.5
This article has three principal objectives: (1) to diagnose the causes of these
theoretical inaccuracies; (2) to describe their deleterious effects on public libel
doctrine; and (3) to state the significance of this impact for modern defamation
law reform. Part I begins by exploring eighteenth-century libertarian thought for
indications of the press’s quasi-constitutional role in holding power to account.
Besides establishing precursors to contemporary notions of freedom of the press
and watchdog journalism, this enquiry confirms the press’s critical function
as a horizontal accountability mechanism.6 Unlike other extra-governmental
methods, the press supplies full-spectrum accountability, capable in principle
of checking all libel plaintiffs and branches of government within any form of
representative democracy.
Part II proceeds by distinguishing the two democratic models at the
core of our enquiry: Alexander Meiklejohn’s “self-governance” rationale and
Vincent Blasi’s “checking value” of the press.7 As we shall see, each highlights
different aspects of democratic theory and supports a distinct conception of the
press, yet the two models are all too often conflated. As a result, public libel
doctrine continues to reflect an improper balancing of freedom of expression
4.

5.
6.

7.

376 US 254 (1964) [Sullivan]. See also Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd, [1994]
HCA 46 [Theophanous]; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp, [1997] HCA 25; Reynolds v
Times Newspapers Ltd, [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) [Reynolds]; Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe,
[2006] UKHL 44; Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, [2012] UKSC 11; Lange v Atkinson, [1998]
3 NZLR 424 (CA) [Lange, 1998]; Lange v Atkinson, [2000] 1 NZLR 257 (PC); Lange v
Atkinson, [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA); Grant v Torstar Corp, 2009 SCC 61 [Grant].
Stephenson, supra note 2, ch 1.
See e.g. Pippa Norris, “Watchdog Journalism” in Mark Bovens, Robert E Goodin & Thomas
Schillemans, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014) 525; Pippa Norris, ed, Public Sentinel: News Media & Governance Reform
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010).
See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1965) [Meiklejohn, Political Freedom]; Alexander Meiklejohn,
“The First Amendment is an Absolute” (1961) 1 Sup Ct Rev 245 [Meiklejohn, “The First
Amendment”]; Vincent Blasi, “The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory” (1977) 2
American Bar Foundation Research J 521 [Blasi, “Checking”].
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and reputation, overly discounting the former. Part II then examines two
underlying causes of public libel law’s undertheorizing, arguing that difficulties
marshalling democratic theory are due primarily to incomplete articulations of
free expression’s core justifications and misguided attempts to subsume these
rationales under single-valued approaches. Both have excessively marginalized
the checking function of the press, the free expression justification most relevant
to adjudicating public libel cases.
Part III commences by describing the deleterious effects of this undertheorizing
on public libel doctrine. This problem of public libel law shows that, even in
cases fundamental to democratic governance where our defamation laws must
carefully balance political criticism against personal character and reputation,
we have unwittingly adopted less press-friendly doctrine than required. That is,
by disregarding accountability concerns and the checking function rationale,
efforts to rebalance free expression against reputation have never reflected the
most relevant or fully articulated aspects of democratic theory. Sound public libel
doctrine, along with defamation law more generally, ultimately depends upon
fully theorized free expression justifications applied to relevant disputes.
Part III concludes our enquiry by identifying five implications of this
undertheorizing for defamation reform in the wake of the Internet, namely, the
need to: (1) avoid one-size-fits-all answers; (2) embrace comparative law analysis;
(3) reinstate accountability in democratic free expression theory; (4) insist upon a
tightly argued theory—doctrine interface; and (5) recognize the etiology of legal
problems in broader socio-political contexts. Above all, special attention must be
paid to proposed reforms affecting government, politicians, or influential public
figures and corporations. These are the plaintiffs whose use of defamation law
poses the greatest threat to democratic legitimacy, and with whom the checking
function’s role in promoting more press-friendly doctrine becomes crucial for
holding to account our political representatives and those exercising significant
power and influence in society.

I. BRITISH PARLIAMENTARISM AND THE “FOURTH
ESTATE”
Before reviewing Meiklejohn and Blasi’s models, it is instructive to situate the
checking function in eighteenth-century libertarian thought.8 This examination
8.

The term “libertarian” refers to Britain’s Radical Whigs, political commentators associated
with the British Whig faction, who were at the forefront of the radical movement in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Despite finding fame and favour only later with
American revolutionaries, these commentators provided impressive analyses of democratic
accountability and the checking function of the press.
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reveals that: (1) Radical Whig and Commonwealthmen publications contained
lucid formulations of the press as a horizontal accountability mechanism; and (2)
by developing substantially similar conceptions of the press’s checking function,
theorists on both sides of the Atlantic established the foundational importance of
accountability to democratic theory and governance.
A. PARLIAMENTARISM AND RADICAL WHIG THEORY

Britain’s Radical Whigs were first to craft systematic defences of press liberty
and to defend citizens’ rights to criticize government. Developing “from
the bowels of the print culture itself ” throughout the late seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries,9 Radical Whigs not only gave the phrase “freedom of the
press” an established meaning, but also provided many of the earliest and most
articulate formulations of the checking function rationale.10 While Parliament’s
control of political criticism extended to prosecutions for breach of privilege by
the House of Commons and (less regularly) the House of Lords,11 England’s
principal response to such criticism involved a powerful antecedent to public
libel: Criminal prosecutions for seditious libel.
1.

CRIMINALIZING POLITICAL DISSENT

The law of seditious libel was most authoritatively pronounced in the Tuchin
case.12 As Lord Chief Justice John Holt explained at the dawn of Britain’s newly
9.

Patrick J Charles & Kevin Francis O’Neill, “Saving the Press Clause from Ruin: The
Customary Origins of a ‘Free Press’ as Interface to the Present and Future” 2012 Utah L Rev
1691 at 1703. See also Melinda S Zook, Radical Whigs and Conspiratorial Politics in Late
Stuart England (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); Leonard
W Levy, ed, Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson: Early American Libertarian Theories
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966); David A Anderson, “The Origins of the Press Clause”
(1983) 30 UCLA L Rev 455; Fredrick Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England
1476–1776: The Rise and Decline of Government Control (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1952) ch 14, 18.
10. Ibid at 64. See also John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton, for the Liberty of
vnlicenc’d Printing, to the Parlament of England (London: Publisher Unknown, 1644).
11. Siebert, supra note 9 at 368-74.
12. (1704) 90 ER 1133 [Tuchin]. While a tiny portion of Britain’s adult population could vote at
this time, this only supported the Radical Whigs’ resolve to safeguard political accountability
through extra-governmental institutions. This insight is supported by public accountability
scholarship, which confirms that general elections are among the weakest and least reliable
accountability mechanisms, aligning voter preferences with government policy only over
many years or decades. See e.g. Mark E Warren, “Accountability and Democracy” in Mark
Bovens, Robert E Goodin & Thomas Schillemans, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Public
Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 39 at 45. See also Bernard Manin,
Adam Przeworski & Susan C Stokes, “Elections and Representation” in Adam Przeworski,
Susan C Stokes & Bernard Manin, eds, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation
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emerging parliamentary democracy, this offence left little room for criticizing
government entities:
If men should not be called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion
of the Government, no Government can subsist; for it is very necessary for every
Government, that the people should have a good opinion of it. And nothing can
be worse to any Government, than to endeavour to procure animosities as to the
management of it. This has been always look’d upon as a crime, and no Government
can be safe unless it is punished.13

After England’s statutory licensing system “died on grounds of expediency”
in the late seventeenth century,14 Radical Whigs redefined such anti-democratic
views in response to rising seditious libel prosecutions. Following earlier
treatises by Charles Blount (under pseudonym “Philopatris”) and John
Toland,15 Matthew Tindal characterized the checking function of the press as an
extra-governmental check on political power, arguing that “[t]he liberty of the
Press must keep a Ministry within some tolerable Bounds, by exposing their ill
Designs to the People.”16 Besides endorsing the press’s checking function, Tindal
astutely forecasted the perils of government public relations and unrestrained
executive power.
Arguably, “[n]o libertarian theorist … progressed beyond the
no-prior-restraints concept of freedom of the press until ‘Cato’ burst upon
the scene.”17 Cato’s Letters was published in London newspapers by Whig
political journalists John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon.18 Though debatable

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 29 at 50.
13. Tuchin, supra note 12 at 1133-34.
14. Levy, supra note 9 at xxii. See also Siebert, supra note 9 at 260-63; J L De Lolme, The
Constitution of England; In Which it is Compared Both with the Republican Form of
Government, and the Other Monarchies in Europe (London: Publisher Unknown, 1822) at
172-73; Licensing of the Press Act, 1662 (UK), 14 Car II, c 33.
15. See Philopatris [Charles Blunt], A Just Vindication of Learning: or, An Humble Address to the
High Court of Parliament In behalf of the Liberty of the Press (London: Publisher Unknown,
1679); John Toland, A Letter to a Member of Parliament, Shewing, that a Restraint On the
Press Is inconsistent with the Protestant Religion, and dangerous to the Liberties of the Nation
(London: Publisher Unknown, 1698).
16. Matthew Tindal, Reasons Against Restraining the Press (London: Publisher Unknown, 1704) at
13. See also John Asgill, An Essay for the Press (London: Publisher Unknown, 1712); Joseph
Addison, The Thoughts of a Tory Author, Concerning the Press: With the Opinion of the Ancients
and Moderns, about Freedom of Speech and Writing (London: Publisher Unknown, 1712).
17. Levy, supra note 9 at xxiii.
18. John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters: Or, Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious,
And other important Subjects, vol 1-4 (London: Publisher Unknown, 1723-24).
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whether Cato’s Letters owed much to Tindal and earlier Radical Whigs19 when
contrasted with the submissive citizenry sanctioned in the Tuchin case, a bold
theory of political accountability was developed in their four essays published
from 1720 to 1722.
In “Of Freedom of Speech: That the same is inseparable from Publick Liberty,”
the authors proposed an unflinching model of free expression, challenging Lord
Chief Justice Holt’s prior pronouncements:
That Men ought to speak well of the Governours, is true, while their Governours
deserve to be well spoken of; but to do publick Mischief, without hearing of it, is
only the Prerogative and Felicity of Tyranny: A free People will be shewing that they
are so, by their Freedom of Speech.20

Trenchard and Gordon also conceived magisterial duties as consonant with
fiduciary obligations, representative government being “nothing else but the
Attendance of the Trustees of the People upon the Interest and Affairs of the
People.”21 For this reason, “it is the Part and Business of the People … to see
whether they be well or ill transacted.”22 Associating press coverage with improved
disclosure of political misconduct, they reasoned:
Misrepresentation of publick Measures is easily overthrown, by representing publick
Measures truly; when they are honest, they ought to be publickly known, that they
may be publickly commended; but if they are knavish or pernicious, they ought to
be publickly exposed, in order to be publickly detested.23

Likewise, in “Reflections upon Libelling,”24 the authors endorsed
strengthened seditious libel defences. Liberating justification from its restriction
“to private and personal Failings,” only,25 Cato reasoned that “[t]he exposing
… of publick Wickedness, as it is a Duty which every Man owes to Truth and
his Country, can never be a Libel.”26 In “Discourse upon Libels,”27 Trenchard
and Gordon again implicated the corrective effect of newspapers, insisting that

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Charles & O’Neill, supra note 9 at 1712.
Trenchard & Gordon, supra note 18, vol 1 at 98.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 101-02.
Ibid at 252-61.
Ibid at 253.
Ibid.
Trenchard & Gordon, supra note 18, vol 3 at 292-99.

24

(2018) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

“[w]hat are usually call’d Libels, undoubtedly keep great Men in Awe, and are
some Check upon their Behaviour.”28
In the end, it is hard to disagree that “Cato’s Letters was the high-water
mark of libertarian theory until the close of the eighteenth century.”29 While
not attacking seditious libels entirely (i.e., false libellous statements remained
unopposed),30 Cato nonetheless claimed that: (1) government is grounded in
fiduciary obligations owed by political representatives to the citizenry; (2)
a primary obligation of citizens is to monitor and expose public misconduct;
(3) freedom of speech and the press are inextricably linked to these monitoring
activities; and (4) justification should constitute a complete defence to seditious
libel. In fact, so comprehensive were these prescriptions for political liberty that
very nearly only the press required further elaboration.
2.

THE CORRECTIVE EFFECT OF THE PRESS

Another surge of libertarian thought began later in the eighteenth century,
accompanied by increasing demand for press liberty. Legal historians confirm
that following Cato’s Letters, the phrase “freedom of the press” was referenced “in
the courts as early as 1732 and in the House of Commons in 1738.”31
For instance, Father of Candor, a prominent Whig supporter and pamphleteer,
reasoned that, since public officials’ posts “are not like any individual’s particular
trade, profession or fortune, … [t]heir holding ought only to be quam diu bene
se gesserint [during good behaviour], and of this the people at large ought to be
made judges.”32 Indeed, when witnessing political misconduct, he observed it
was “natural for [citizens] to complain, to communicate their thoughts to others,
… and to remonstrate in print against the public proceedings.”33 Endorsing an
independent and corrective press, he insisted that “[t]he liberty of exposing and
opposing a bad administration by the pen is among the necessary privileges of
a free people, and is perhaps the greatest benefit that can be derived from the
liberty of the press.”34

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ibid at 243.
Levy, supra note 9 at xxvi.
Trenchard & Gordon, supra note 18, vol 1 at 257.
Siebert, supra note 9 at 383.
Father of Candor, An Enquiry into the Doctrine, Lately Propagated, Concerning Libels,
Warrants, and the Seizure of Papers (London: Publisher Unknown, 1764) at 31
[emphasis in original].
33. Ibid [emphasis added].
34. Ibid at 32.
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Father of Candor also formulated remarkable procedural criticisms of seditious
libel. Describing an ex officio information as “the exercise of … an unnecessary and
grievous prerogative,”35 he cautioned that “[t]here is … no offence which is oftener
prosecuted by an information, ex officio, than a libel.”36 Disapproving of “the ease
and certainty of laying” an information,37 Father of Candor told of this practice
silencing the press and intimidating printers with consequences “as terrible as
a drawn sword suspended by a thread, hanging over their heads.”38 To protect
publishers from arbitrary prosecutions and resultant libel chill, he advocated
shifting to the Crown the legal burdens of falsehood and malice,39 a press-friendly
modification not dissimilar to the actual malice rule. At last, while Father of
Candor (like Cato) did not oppose seditious libels entirely,40 he endorsed the
checking function rationale unreservedly, advising that “[a]nimadversions upon
the conduct of ministers, submitted to the eye of the public in print, must in the
nature of the thing be a great check upon their bad actions.”41
An increasingly refined conception of the press as a horizontal accountability
mechanism was advanced in the Letters of Junius.42 Published anonymously from
1769 to 1772, they contained strong arguments for press liberty and were inspired
by a foreign-born legal theorist of immense creativity and insight, Jean-Louis De
Lolme. In his opening “Dedication to the English Nation,” Junius celebrated the
press as an essential component of libertarian thought, remarking that press liberty
“is the Palladium of all the civil, political, and religious rights of an Englishman
… . The power of King, Lords, and Commons is not an arbitrary power. They are
the trustees, not the owners of the estate. The fee-simple is in US.”43
Further describing how the power exercised by “King, Lords, and Commons”
is actually checked, Junius appealed to “the forms and principles of our particular
constitution,”44 insisting that “a constant examination into the characters and
conduct of ministers and magistrates should be … promoted and encouraged.”45
In yet another strong endorsement of the checking function, the anonymous
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Ibid at 9 [emphasis added].
Ibid at 7 [emphasis in original].
Ibid at 8.
Ibid at 6.
Ibid at 11.
Ibid at 32.
Ibid at 29.
Junius, The Letters of Junius, vol 1-2 (London: Publisher Unknown, 1792).
Ibid at iv-v [emphasis in original].
Ibid at v.
Ibid at xiii.
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author professed: “They, who conceive that our newspapers are no restraint upon
bad men, or impediment to the execution of bad measures, know nothing of
this country.”46
Junius also endorsed Jean-Louis De Lolme, “a foreign writer, whose
essay on the English constitution I beg leave to recommend to the public,
as a performance, deep, solid and ingenious.”47 Considered as one of the two
“most esteemed authors who have written upon the English Constitution”
(alongside Blackstone),48 De Lolme, in The Constitution of England, examined
the institutional preconditions for democratic accountability, particularly the
institutional press.49
A fundamental aspect of these preconditions was maintaining an adversarial
relationship between government and the press. At its base, De Lolme’s analysis
was premised on “the censorial power, … the exercise of which (contrary to that
of the legislative power) must be left to the people themselves.”50 Importantly,
De Lolme knew that “this power cannot produce its intended effect any farther
than [it] is made known and declared,”51 explaining that “it is this public notoriety
of all things that constitutes the supplemental power, or check.”52 Appealing to
their corrective effect, De Lolme endorsed newspapers as the censorial power’s
utmost institutional manifestation, explaining that:
As [politicians] are thereby made sensible that all their actions are exposed to public
view, they dare not venture upon those acts of partiality, those secret connivances at
the iniquities of particular persons, or those vexatious practices which the man in
office is but too apt to be guilty of, when, exercising his office at a distance from the
public eye, and, as it were, in a corner, he is satisfied that, provided he be cautious,
he may dispense with being just.53

Moreover, when the censorial power manifests in a strong and independent
press, De Lolme expected that public officials “cannot conceal from themselves

46. Ibid at xiii-xiv.
47. Ibid at xxix. See also Michael I Meyerson, “The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint
Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of
Powers” (2001) 34 Ind L Rev 295 at 312-13; Joseph Kary, “The Constitutionalization of
Quebec Libel Law, 1848-2004” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall LJ 229 at 249-50; Charles &
O’Neill, supra note 9.
48. Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 10th ed by Phillips Bradley (New York: Alfred
A Knopf, 1966) vol 2 at 355.
49. Supra note 14.
50. Ibid at 170.
51. Ibid at 170-71 [emphasis added].
52. Ibid at 175.
53. Ibid at 176.
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the disagreeable truths which resound from all sides,”54 and must “put up even
with ridicule.”55 Press liberty is therefore essential because “it enables the people
effectually to exert those means which the constitution has bestowed on them,
of influencing the motions of the government.”56
Evaluating the censorial power’s institutionalization in England, De Lolme
noted approvingly that its constitution had “allotted to the people themselves
the province of openly canvassing and arraigning the conduct of those who are
invested with any branch of public authority.”57 As for newspapers themselves,
De Lolme reassured Britons that “it scarcely ever happens that a subject, in which
the laws, or, in general, the public welfare, are really concerned, fails to call
forth some able writer, who … communicates to the public his observations
and complaints.”58
In the end, De Lolme provides significant insight into the checking
function rationale. Identifying censorial power as the wellspring of democratic
accountability, De Lolme saw the press as a vital extra-governmental mechanism
for holding power to account. Underappreciated in his time, De Lolme’s
scholarship was exemplary,59 as shown by the following quixotic passage on the
corrective effect of the press:
In short, whoever considers what it is that constitutes the moving principle of what
we call great affairs, and the invincible sensibility of man to the opinion of his
fellow-creatures, will not hesitate to affirm, that, if it were possible for the liberty of
the press to exist in a despotic government, and (what is not less difficult) for it to
exist without changing the constitution, this liberty would alone form a counterpoise
to the power of the prince.60

3.

CONTAINING AND RESTRICTING POLITICAL POWER

British libertarian thought entered a final phase following unsuccessful criminal
prosecutions of the publication and sale of Letters of Junius in 1770.61 Critics
such as Capel Lofft, James Adair, and Robert Hall redefined freedom of speech
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Ibid at 177.
Ibid.
Ibid at 178 [emphasis added].
Ibid at 171-72.
Ibid at 176 [emphasis added].
See e.g. Meyerson, supra note 47 at 312. Meyerson notes that “John Adams referred to De
Lolme’s books as ‘the best defence of the political balance of three powers that ever was
written.’” De Lolme was also cited by the US Supreme Court in Near v Minnesota, 283 US
697 at 714 (1931).
60. De Lolme, supra note 14 at 178 [emphasis added].
61. Siebert, supra note 9 at 385ff.
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and press liberty in two respects. First, they examined the nature and effects
of political power, thereby clarifying its relationship to the press. Second, they
progressively disavowed verbal political crimes.
Capel Lofft’s An Essay on the Law of Libels contained many reflections on
democratic accountability.62 Emphasizing the impact of unchecked ambition on
governmental stability, Lofft reasoned:
In every civil establishment that has any Constitution to lose, there is an incessant
tendency to decay; the causes which produce this, power possessed and power to
be acquired, wage everlasting war against the Freedom of the Whole. To reduce
the excess of power as low as possible; to make it circulate so that the holders of
it may be ever mindful they have a deposit, not a property; to have no member
of the Community who can say he is not a sharer in its political rights; to have
full information on constitutional franchises, and free investigation of public
measures;—this it is to be a FREE PEOPLE.63

Endorsing newspapers as the preferred means for checking political
misconduct, Lofft likened the press to the “Attorney General of the People,”
explaining that “[a]s a defensive, remedial effort, great may be its use: by the very
apprehension that it may be used, it is a check.”64
In Discussions of the Law of Libels,65 James Adair’s analysis extended to
England’s political and constitutional structure.66 Observing that despots and
governments forbid public libels only “as an atonement for the affront to his
authority” or to protect “the government itself from censure,”67 Adair dismissed
verbal political crimes as anti-democratic, concluding: “I doubt whether the mere
defamation of the subject can, upon the principles of our government, ever be a
public offence.”68
Similarly, in An Apology for the Freedom of the Press, and for General Liberty,69
Robert Hall professed that “to suppress mere opinions by any other method than
reason and argument, is the height of tyranny.”70 As with Adair, Hall cautiously
grounded his argument in concerns with institutional design, noting that “[t]o
62.
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render the magistrate a judge of truth, and engage his authority in the suppression
of opinions, shews an inattention to the nature and design of political society.”71
Exalting the press as a check on the power placed in government officials,72 Hall
concluded: “[t]he controul of the public mind over the conduct of ministers
exerted through the medium of the press, has been regarded by the best writers
both in our country and on the continent, as the main support of our liberties.”73
B. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
1.

RUDIMENTARY COMPARATIVE ANALYSES

On the other side of the Atlantic, American theorists were likewise provoked by
the Sedition Act,74 which criminalized “false, scandalous, or malicious writing”
against President John Adams’s administration.75 Republican theorists George
Hay,76 James Madison,77 and Tunis Wortman78 opposed this criminalization
of political speech, arguing in some cases for absolutist interpretations of free
expression and the press under the First Amendment.
Foremost among their concerns was discerning the institutional arrangements
conducive to political accountability. George Hay’s An Essay on the Liberty of the
Press provides an instructive example.79 Insisting that “freedom of the press” meant
a “total exemption from any law making any publication whatever criminal,”80
Hay delivered rudimentary comparative law reflections on British and American
political and constitutional structures.
Supporters of the Sedition Act claimed that freedom of the press meant only
exemption from prior restraint. Hay rejected this as extreme fallacy, predicting that
within one year, “a press absolutely free, would … ‘humble in the dust and ashes,’
the ‘stupendous fabric,’ of the British government.”81 In statements calling for
71.
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more subtle analysis, Hay reasoned that “[i]n Britain, a legislative control over the
press, is, perhaps essential to the preservation of the ‘present order of things;’ but
it does not follow, that such control is essential here.”82 Speculating on America’s
need for a “total exemption of the press from any kind of legislative control,”83
Hay noted disapprovingly that in England, “the parliament is acknowledged to
be omnipotent. … In Britain there is no constitution, no limitation of legislative
power.”84 But what escaped Hay’s notice was that parliamentarism might require
a more independent, adversarial press precisely because of its limited institutional
checks and balances. Without a codified constitution, judicial review of legislative
enactments, or sharing of power amongst executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, the press’s role in checking public officials arguably assumes greater
importance for maintaining adequate accountability.
Another comparative analysis was provided by James Madison in his “Virginia
Report of 1799–1800.”85 Madison advised that a prosecution for seditious libel
“ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against that right of
freely examining public characters and measures, … the only effectual guardian
of every other right.”86 Should representatives misbehave, Madison observed:
“[I]t is natural and proper, that … they should be brought into contempt or
disrepute, and incur the hatred of the people.”87
Like Hay, Madison engaged in comparative analyses to “place this subject
in the clearest light.”88 Noting that in Britain, “the danger of encroachments
on the rights of the people is understood to be confined to the executive
magistrate,”89 Madison argued that “[t]he representatives of the people in the
Legislature are not only exempt themselves from distrust, but are considered as
sufficient guardians of the rights of their constituents against the danger from the
Executive.”90 He reasoned that “[u]nder such a government as this, an exemption
of the press from previous restraint … is all the freedom that can be secured to
it.”91 Republican governments, by comparison, “may well be supposed to require
a greater freedom of animadversion than might be tolerated by the genius of such
a government as that of Great Britain.”92
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This analysis suffers similar defects. Writing in highly abstract terms,
Madison does not specify who “understood” that “danger of encroachments on
the rights of the people” was confined only to Britain’s executive branch.93 Surely
Lofft, Adair, and Hall would not have capitulated on this point; all were aware
of prosecutions against authors and printers for offences against parliamentary
privilege.94 Moreover, it is unclear how differences concerning British and
American constitutions logically entail Madison’s conclusions. As with Hay, the
prospect that parliamentary governments require a stronger press to expose and
check official misconduct was not considered.
2.

A FREE AND INDEPENDENT PRESS

Greater institutional insight was provided by Tunis Wortman’s A Treatise
Concerning Political Enquiry and the Liberty of the Press.95 Justly hailed as “an
American masterpiece, the only equivalent on this side of the Atlantic to
Milton and Mill,”96 Wortman’s piece employed a comparative approach fixed
in a pessimistic understanding of human nature and a profound curiosity for
discerning the structural nature of free institutions.
Wortman began by positing the revisionary power of society, a concept
highly resonant with De Lolme’s censorial power. Comprising each individual’s
right to determine whether government had discharged its obligations, the
revisionary power necessitated “that Society should incessantly maintain a species
of censorial jurisdiction over its political institutions.”97 Wortman explained that
“[t]he Revisionary Right of Society is not peculiar to any particular form of civil
institution: it is an inherent and fundamental right of our social existence.”98
Turning to public libels, Wortman observed that “[a]n unrestricted
investigation of the conduct of Magistrates, is not only a necessary preventative
of the encroachments of Ambition, but it is also the only preservative of Public
Liberty which can be resorted to without endangering the tranquility of a State.”99
Necessitating an independent and adversarial press, he reasoned that “Public
Opinion should not only remain unconnected with Civil Authority, but be
rendered superior to its controul.”100 The structure of the press as a “Fourth Estate”
was perhaps nowhere more clearly apprehended than by Wortman.
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Wortman unsurprisingly held the press in high regard. Noting that “[p]rinting
may justly be considered as the most powerful benefactor of mankind,”101
he commended the press as the “vigilant guardian of Public Liberty, whose
eye can penetrate, and whose voice be heard, in every quarter of the State.”102
Conceding with Lofft that “[a]ll Governments have an inevitable tendency to
aspire,”103 Wortman defended the press in a seminal—if slightly hyperbolic—
passage worth citing in full:
It should always be remembered, that Government possesses an evident advantage
and superiority over every species of opposition; it is a regular, disciplined, and
organized corps; its moral and physical energies are concentrated and combined;
it is capable of steady premeditation and continual design; it never loses sight of
its object: but, with undeviating constancy, pursues its plans through the mazes
of events, and in the midst of every obstacle. It is equally qualified to contrive and
to execute: It perpetually exists, and slumbers not. Let it be added, it directs and
commands all the resources of a State. Unless, therefore, some vigilant, powerful,
and independent corrective is retained by Society, nothing can prevent its becoming
the devoted victim of Despotism.104

Predictably, Wortman insisted that “[t]ruth can never be a libel,” adding
that “[t]he system which maintains so odious a proposition, is founded in the
most palpable injustice.”105 Wortman explained: “To maintain such doctrine,
is to declare open war against Political Enquiry, [and] entirely destroy the
responsibility of the Magistrate.”106
Still, despite exposing the institutional dynamics of the checking function,
Wortman left unresolved the specific doctrinal implications of public libels that
had intrigued Hay, Madison, and their Radical Whig predecessors, certain only
of seditious libel that this “dangerous exotic can never be reconciled to the genius
and constitution of a Representative Commonwealth.”107
C. CONCLUSION

Our review of libertarian theory reveals multiple points of interest. First, British
and American theorists developed remarkably similar formulations of the press’s
role in checking governmental power, thereby demonstrating its foundational
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importance to democracy. Second, early formulations of the checking function
probed issues of political and constitutional structure and debated as to which
structure maximized political liberty and press freedom. As in De Lolme’s
The Constitution of England,108 direct comparison with other political and
constitutional structures was endorsed. Overall, compared with the mishandling
of democratic models examined in Part II, this analysis demonstrates that
accountability concerns were deeply embedded in early democratic theory
and experience.

II. DISTINGUISHING DEMOCRATIC MODELS109
A. OVERVIEW

This part begins with a detailed comparison of Alexander Meiklejohn’s
“self-governance” theory and Vincent Blasi’s “checking value” of the press. Since
both models are routinely conflated in public libel jurisprudence, a precise
understanding of their nature and differences is essential. We then identify two
causes of this confusion: (1) free expression’s incomplete “core” of justifications,
and (2) misguided attempts to subsume free expression’s multiple justifications
under single-valued approaches.
B. DEMOCRATIC THEORIZING IN PUBLIC LIBEL JURISPRUDENCE
1.

MEIKLEJOHN’S “SELF-GOVERNANCE” RATIONALE

Alexander Meiklejohn’s self-governance rationale occupies a leading position
among free expression justifications, having been quickly and uncritically
transplanted from its American constitutional context to Britain,110
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Canada,111 and to a lesser extent, Australia112 and New Zealand.113 Yet, despite its
popularity, Meiklejohnian theory is compromised not only by its absolutism and
highly aspirational accounts of democratic citizenship, but also by an unwavering
reluctance to recognize humanity’s shortcomings and contain its recurring abuses.
Meiklejohnian theory therefore not only presents challenges as a practicable
democratic model, but also appears opposed to the philosophy and principles
underlying the US Constitution.114 Above all, Meiklejohn’s model contributes
remarkably little to our understanding of political accountability. The democratic
theory most transferrable across common law jurisdictions is thus conceivably
not Meiklejohn’s, but rather the checking function, despite the former’s grip on
constitutional theorizing and adjudication.
i.

MEIKLEJOHN’S THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC “SELF-GOVERNANCE”

Writing in a post-war McCarthy era of political conformity and suppression of
‘dangerous’ speech, Meiklejohn’s target in his essay “Free Speech and its Relation
to Self-Government” was America’s prevailing doctrine of clear and present
danger.115 Although originating earlier,116 this doctrine was most famously
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applied by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in Abrams v United States,117 which
set out his marketplace of ideas metaphor and underlying reasoning.118
Foremost among Meiklejohn’s concerns was Justice Holmes’s depiction of
human nature. Convinced that, despite his literary eloquence and rhetorical
power, “the thinking of Mr. Holmes about the First Amendment [had] no
such excellence,”119 Meiklejohn expressed grave doubt that Justice Holmes’s
marketplace of ideas was anything but a “partial insight.”120 Alleging that
excessive “individualism” and a pessimistic view of human nature would promote
“intellectual irresponsibility,”121 Meiklejohn insisted that “[u]nder its influence,
there are no standards for determining the difference between the true and
the false,” and that “[t]he truth is what a man or an interest or a nation can
get away with.”122
Unpersuaded by Holmes’s depiction, Meiklejohn provided an aspirational
counterpoint, arguing that “one cannot understand the basic purposes of
our Constitution … unless one sees them as a good man, a man who, in his
political activities, is not merely fighting for what, under the law, he can get, but
is eagerly and generously serving the common welfare.”123 Reproaching Justice
Holmes’s failure to recognize these “sane and solid moral principles,” Meiklejohn
championed a protective role for the First Amendment, arguing that “whatever
else it may mean, the First Amendment is an expression of human goodness.
That amendment, in its own field, stands guard over the general welfare of
the community.”124
Contrastingly, Meiklejohn identified as the highest insight of political
freedom that truth-seeking is simply instrumental to promoting democratic
deliberation and the general welfare. While recognizing the First Amendment
as “a device for the winning of new truth,” Meiklejohn clarified that its primary
purpose was “to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest
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possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which the
citizens of a self-governing society must deal.”125
Contending that freedom of expression “springs from the necessities of the
program of self-government,”126 Meiklejohn construed the First Amendment as “a
deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by
universal suffrage.”127 Besides the Preamble to the US Constitution,128 Meiklejohn
emphasized two provisions informing the First Amendment. First, the guarantee
of parliamentary privilege in Article 1, Section 6 provided a “prohibition against
abridgment of the freedom of speech which is equally uncompromising, equally
absolute, with that of the First Amendment.”129 According to Meiklejohn, since
parliamentary privilege is essential to representative government, public discussion
of its sovereign citizens requires identical protection. Meiklejohn instructed that
“[t]he freedom which we grant to our representatives is merely a derivative of the
prior freedom which belongs to us as voters.”130
Second, Meiklejohn claimed that the Fifth Amendment also clarifies
America’s free speech commitments, which provides that “no person within the
jurisdiction of the laws of the United States may be ‘deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.’”131 As the “liberty” referenced in the Fifth
Amendment includes “liberty of speech,”132 Meiklejohn argued that the First and
Fifth Amendments recognize two radically-different classes of utterances: Private
speech, which may be abridged subject to due process guarantees, and public
speech which, under the First Amendment, must receive absolute protection.133
Defending this strict separation of public and private discourse, Meiklejohn
insisted that the First Amendment “was written to clear the way for thinking
which serves the general welfare.”134 Compared to Justice Holmes and Professor
Zechariah Chafee Jr., who defended the clear and present danger doctrine
by emphasizing its importance for balancing public safety against truth,135
Meiklejohn reminded Americans that “we have decided that the destruction of
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freedom is always unwise, that freedom is always expedient. … It is a reasoned
and sober judgment as to the best available method of guarding the public
safety.”136 Consequently, “no idea may be suppressed because someone in office,
or out of office, has judged it to be ‘dangerous.’”137 Meiklejohn argued that the
First Amendment’s “great declaration is that intellectual freedom is the necessary
bulwark of the public safety. That declaration admits of no exceptions.”138
Consequently, Americans self-govern only insofar as their “deliberate and
informed judgment-making is equipped with the power … to control and direct
the pursuit of private interest in whatever way the public welfare may require.”139
Besides unrestricted public debate, voting assumed paramount significance for
Meiklejohn, who insisted that “we Americans are politically free only insofar
as our voting is free.”140 His theory demands that “our judging of public
issues, whether done separately or in groups, must be free and independent—
must be our own.”141
These electoral expectations also imply substantial social responsibilities,
including reinforcing education to ensure citizens have mandatory minimum
levels of civic understanding. Meiklejohn advised that “[w]e shall not understand
the First Amendment unless we see that underlying it is the purpose that all the
citizens of our self-governing society shall be ‘equally’ educated.”142 Accordingly,
America must be “cultivating the general intelligence” of the people, a “heavy
and basic responsibility” that Congress must promote.143 Idealizing the pastoral
American town hall meeting, Meiklejohn stressed not “the words of the speakers,
but the minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the voting of wise
decisions.”144 In public life, “[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth saying shall be said.”145 Shared understanding and
effective deliberation, not direct participation, were Meiklejohn’s overriding
political concerns.
For example, prior to television and the Internet, Meiklejohn criticized
commercial radio, denouncing it as “not engaged in the task of enlarging
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and enriching human communication,” but rather being solely “engaged in
making money.”146 Arguing that the radio had corrupted “both our morals
and our intelligence,” Meiklejohn insisted that this precursor to modern mass
communications revealed “how hollow may be the victories of the freedom of
speech when our acceptance of the principle is merely formalistic.”147
And herein lies the self-limiting element in Meiklejohnian theory. By focusing
on the moral characteristics deemed essential for self-government, Meiklejohn
disregarded the well-known shortfalls in human nature that prompted America’s
republican government in the first place. At last, while Meiklejohn admirably
embraced the ideals of democratic rule, he contributed precious little to our
understanding of democratic accountability, a seemingly inescapable conclusion
after comparing his theory to the checking function of the press.
2.

BLASI’S “CHECKING VALUE” OF THE PRESS

The dominant authority on the checking function rationale is Professor Vincent
Blasi. In a well-documented review published in the American Bar Foundation
Research Journal in 1977,148 Blasi advised that, along with traditional values
underlying First Amendment theories, “free expression is valuable in part
because of the function it performs in checking the abuse of official power.”149
While First Amendment theories developed in the early-twentieth century
emphasized three values: (1) autonomy; (2) truth-seeking and diversity, captured
by the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor;150 and (3) “self-government,”151 Blasi
nonetheless observed that, in the 1960s and 1970s, the value relevant to free
speech claims and claimants before the US Supreme Court was the Federalist-era
concern of “a free press … in checking the abuse of power by public officials.”152
i.

CONSTITUTIVE PREMISES AND PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES

Professor Blasi provided an authoritative definition of this checking value by
classifying its five constitutive premises. Citing Radical Whigs such as Cato,
Father of Candor, John Wilkes, and Junius, along with James Madison and
Tunis Wortman—all advocating for a strong, independent press as a check
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on government—Blasi sought to better understand the checking function by
examining “the sources of the value, the premises on which it rests, and the ways
in which it differs from other values.”153
First, and most importantly, “[t]he central premise of the checking value
is that the abuse of official power is an especially serious evil—more serious
than the abuse of private power.”154 Blasi warned of government’s effects on
individuals through its “significant investigative capabilities,” its ability to store
and use “vast accumulations of data,” and its “capacity to employ legitimized
violence.”155 Besides expressing concerns that the public “want[s] to believe in
the trustworthiness of … officials,” Blasi warned of public officials acquiring “an
inflated sense of self-importance,” and of greater social costs when “important
expectations have been defeated” through official misconduct.156
The checking function’s second premise involves accepting “an essentially
pessimistic view of human nature and human institutions.”157 Professor Blasi
observed that “[h]uman beings have an unmistakable tendency to hurt each
other, so much so that the prevention of man-made evil can be viewed as the
most important task of all political arrangements.”158 Although proponents of the
checking function might value free expression for other reasons, their primary
concern will be encouraging the press’ “modest capacity to mitigate the human
suffering that other humans cause,” especially the greater human suffering “caused
by persons who hold public office.”159
Given the increasing size and complexity of contemporary democracies,
a third premise posits a “need for well-organized, well-financed, professional
critics to serve as a counterforce to government.”160 This requires critics
proficient at “acquiring enough information to pass judgment on the actions
of government,” who are “capable of disseminating their information and
judgments to the general public.”161 Blasi cautioned that “if modern government
were ever to gain complete control of the channels of mass communication or to
incapacitate its professional critics in some other way, there would be no effective
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check on official misconduct,” a concern highly resonant with today’s era of
digital communication and surveillance.162
The checking function also includes a fourth premise that “the general
populace must be the ultimate judge of the behavior of public officials.”163
Although implying a connection to democratic theory, Blasi rightly noted that
“it is the democratic theory of John Locke and Joseph Schumpeter, not that of
Alexander Meiklejohn.”164 While a proponent of the checking function might be
a direct democrat, “in the sense of favoring a significant participatory role for the
ordinary citizen in day-to-day governance,” Blasi surmised that he or she must
“be at least a Lockean democrat,”165 in that the general population defines and
enforces norms relating to official misconduct.
Finally, judging government officials implies a fifth premise:
“[T]hat the concept of ‘misconduct’ has meaning in the context of governmental
decision-making.”166 This implies “violation by public officials of norms that
transcend a wide spectrum of policy differences.”167 Professor Blasi offered the
following examples: (1) fraudulent behaviour violating criminal laws, such as
“embezzlement or the acceptance of a bribe”; (2) unconstitutional behaviour;
(3) improper involvement in foreign affairs, including “the deliberate bombing
of civilians during wartime” and “the assassination of foreign political figures”;
(4) “serious misrepresentations” made to government institutions or the public;
and (5) using public office to augment one’s economic position.168 All told,
the checking function provides a valuable supplement to traditional freedom
of expression justifications, particularly in light of the considerable gaps in
Meiklejohnian theory.
ii.

DISTINGUISHING THE CHECKING FUNCTION FROM TRADITIONAL
JUSTIFICATIONS

Refining the checking function’s significance for constitutional adjudication,
Professor Blasi outlined its dissimilarities to traditional free expression values.
Committed to demonstrating its theoretical independence, he insisted that the
checking function “could never replace the existing First Amendment value
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matrix but rather should be viewed as potentially a vital additional component in
that constellation of interdependent values.”169
Blasi first observed that a proponent of the checking function “views speech
of a certain content as important because of its consequences: alerting the polity to
the facts or implications of official behaviour, presumably triggering responses that
will mitigate the ill effects.”170 Proponents of the autonomy value are, by contrast,
“more concerned with the process of belief formation and communication; the
value does not rest on any empirical propositions regarding the social effects
of speech.”171 Moreover, due to autonomy’s “largely irreducible” nature,
constitutional claims based on autonomy “tend to be absolute in nature.”172
The checking function, however, is amenable to a balancing analysis involving
“competing regulatory interests.”173 A final difference is that the checking function
“supports doctrines that makes constitutional protection a function of who is
speaking and what is being said,” suggesting “a distinctive constitutional role
for certain specialized countervailing forces in the society and certain specialized
speech and press activities.”174 Thus, “a proponent of the checking value places
a premium on, and … may accord extraordinary constitutional protection to,
speech … concerning the behavior of public officials.”175
Second, although the checking and truth-seeking values “both support
the protection of speech because of its social consequences rather than on
the basis of … intrinsic moral worth,”176 the checking function focuses on a
much narrower concern; namely, scrutinizing public officials will produce more
good—by preventing or containing official misconduct—than harm, such as
“diminution in the efficiency of the public service or weakening of the trust that
ultimately holds any political society together.”177 Thus, “exposing government
misbehaviour might be accorded a level of constitutional protection higher than
that accorded other speech activities which have only the more general effect of
enhancing diversity.”178

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Ibid at 548.
Ibid at 546 [emphasis in original].
Ibid [emphasis in original].
Ibid at 547.
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Ibid at 547-48.
Ibid at 548.
Ibid at 551.
Ibid at 552.
Ibid at 552-53.
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Blasi also noted that while the checking and truth-seeking values similarly
“focus on the interests of listeners and readers rather than speakers and writers,”
the checking function emphasizes a narrower need for information about what
the government is doing.179 This outweighs public advocacy, since, for Blasi,
“[t]he moral and political implications of official behavior will often be apparent
without extended public debate.”180 Thus, “[t]he most important stage in the
checking process is typically that during which the public is first made aware of
what is going on.”181 Acknowledging the checking function as an independent
free expression value should then provide greater protection for “speech activities
which relate to the dissemination of information divorced from advocacy.”182
Of course, Blasi accepted that distinguishing Meiklejohnian theory
“requires the most extensive treatment.”183 Both theories focus on “political
consequences of speech” and give special protection to political communications,
both emphasize “readers and listeners,” and “both stem from democratic
conceptions of sovereignty.”184 Blasi sensibly advised that “the checking value has
the potential to influence First Amendment doctrine only insofar as it can be
shown to have premises and implications significantly different from those of the
self-government value.”185
According to Blasi, the most obvious difference is that “[t]he checking
value focuses on the particular problem of misconduct by government officials,”
whereas the self-government theory “makes no such narrow ordering.”186 In fact,
Meiklejohn provides absolute protection to “all speech relevant to the process
by which citizens decide how to vote.”187 According to Blasi, “[a] proponent of
the checking value does not deny that myriad harms to the body politic may
be forestalled by speech activities or that many goals of a democratic system of
government may be served by … certain forms of communication.”188 But given
the dangers of official misconduct, “its prevention and containment is a goal that
takes precedence over all other goals of the political system.”189
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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Another important difference is that the checking function permits balancing
the consequences of speech activities, whereas constitutional protection for
“self-governing” speech must be unqualified.190 As discussed above, for Meiklejohn,
“any limitation imposed by the agents of the people on the self-governing speech
of citizens is simply an impossible notion under our political compact.”191
Although the checking function is consistent with private or group interest
political theories, Blasi rightly observed that “the [checking] value is especially
important in a society characterized to a large degree by competition and the
pursuit of private satisfaction.”192
Finally, Professor Blasi noted two differences of emphasis. First, Meiklejohn
places “slightly more emphasis on argumentation … than does the checking
value.”193 The checking function emphasizes “shortage of information” as the
most serious issue relating to political problems.194 Second, the two models view
social and political elites differently. Blasi rightly noted that “Meiklejohn [was]
reluctant to assign a special role in the governmental system to any group of
people.”195 Public officials were understood as “agents of the collective political
will.”196 By contrast, since “a proponent of the checking value sees political
decision-making more as a product of contending forces and counterforces,”197
“public officials” are seen as “potential oppressors rather than as … agents.”198
This view recognizes that “public officials are qualitatively different from ordinary
voters” and that they can be “effectively checked … by other elite groups with
similarly specialized powers, skills, and attitudes.”199 Besides organized political
opposition, another elite counterforce is the institutional press. According to
Blasi, only the checking function highlights this structural role and justifies
treating “journalists differently than ordinary citizens in determining what rights
are guaranteed by the First Amendment.”200
As illustrated in Table 1, each model highlights different aspects of
democratic governance. Specifically, where Meiklejohn emphasizes deliberative
190.
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democracy and the press’s role in facilitating electoral decision making, the
checking function focuses on political accountability and the liberal watchdog
function of the press. Still, despite their considerable differences, legal scholars
have complicated matters by failing to differentiate them. As examined below,
difficulties marshalling democratic theory are due both to incomplete articulations
of freedom of expression’s core justifications and misguided attempts to subsume
these core values under various single-valued approaches. In both instances, the
theoretical differences characterizing each model are obscured.
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF MEIKLEJOHN’S AND BLASI’S MODELS OF
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Meiklejohn’s “Self-Governance” Theory

Blasi’s “Checking Value” of the Press

Emphasizes deliberation and promoting
general welfare

Emphasizes accountability and exposing
political misconduct

Political representatives viewed as agents

Political representatives viewed as potential
oppressors

Idealized view of democratic rule and human
nature

Pessimistic view of human nature and
democratic institutions

Focuses on and protects all speech relevant to
electoral issues

Focuses specifically on misconduct by
government officials

Emphasizes argumentation as part of deliberative process

Emphasizes shortage of information about
political power

Press conceptualized as a conduit for
information

Press conceptualized as a “fourth estate” or
independent watchdog

Occupies leading position among democratic
freedom of expression justifications worldwide

Has been marginalized and discounted by
judges, legislators, and legal academics

C. FREE EXPRESSION’S INCOMPLETE “CORE”

Although defamation law has long recognized freedom of expression’s
significance,201 underlying free speech justifications have only recently been
201. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1765-1769) vol 4 at 150-53; George Chase, “Criticism of Public Officers and Candidates
for Office” (1889) 23 Am L Rev 346; Hugh Fraser, “The Privileges of the Press in Relation
to the Law of Libel” (1891) 7 Law Q Rev 158; Van Vechten Veeder, “Freedom of Public
Discussion” (1910) 23 Harv L Rev 413.
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recognized by courts and commentators. Despite seminal defences by John Milton
and John Stuart Mill,202 as well as twentieth-century contributions by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis of the US Supreme Court,203 the current popularized core
of free expression justifications originated with Thomas Emerson’s 1962-1963
article “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment.”204 In his article,
Professor Emerson explored the relationships between the First Amendment’s
philosophical rationales, general principles, and specific doctrines. Crucially,
this American-borne analysis was supported by a far-reaching classification of
four free speech rationales central to the modern “liberal constitutional state.”
Emerson instructed:
Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring individual
self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing
participation by the members of the society in social, including political, decisionmaking, and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in the
society.205

Eliciting Meiklejohn’s democratic self-governance theory,206 Emerson stated
ambiguously that “[t]he crucial point, however, is not that freedom of expression is
politically useful, but that it is indispensable to the operation of a democratic form
of government.”207 Stressing the American electorate’s deliberative requirement
for “full freedom of expression both in forming individual judgments and in
forming the common judgment,”208 Emerson’s account of democracy owed very
little (if anything) to notions of democratic accountability.

202. See Milton, supra note 10; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W Parker
and Son, 1859).
203. See Abrams, supra note 117; Whitney v California, 274 US 357 (1927).
204. Thomas I Emerson, “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment” (1962-1963)
72 Yale LJ 877.
205. Ibid at 878-79 [emphasis added]. For truth-seeking, see Stanley Ingber, “The Marketplace
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth” (1984) Duke LJ 1; Christopher T Wonnell, “Truth and the
Marketplace of Ideas” (1986) 19 UC Davis L Rev 669; William P Marshall, “In Defense
of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification” (1995) 30 Ga L Rev 1. For
autonomy, see Brian C Murchison, “Speech and the Self-Realization Value” (1998) 33
Harv CR-CLL Rev 443; C Edwin Baker, “Autonomy and Free Speech” (2011) 27 Const
Commentary 251. For democratic self-governance, see Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra
note 7; Meiklejohn, “The First Amendment,” supra note 7; Brian C Murchison, “Speech
and the Self-Governance Value” (2006) 14 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 1251; Robert Post,
“Participatory Democracy and Free Speech” (2011) 97 Va L Rev 477.
206. See Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra note 7.
207. Supra note 204 at 883.
208. Ibid.
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Although predating influential judgments and academic commentary
endorsing watchdog journalism and the press,209 Emerson’s article has nevertheless
assumed an authoritative status on free speech justifications, both within and—
more remarkably—outside America.210 Unfortunately, Emerson’s free speech
taxonomy was deficient from inception, notably overlooking the checking
function rationale. Demonstrating the doctrinal implications of his closed
inventory of free expression values, Emerson insisted that “alternative principles
have no substantial support, and that our system of freedom of expression must
be based upon and designed for the realization of the fundamental propositions
embodied in the traditional theory.”211
Emerson’s omission of accountability concerns was all the more surprising
given his otherwise keen awareness of threats to political liberty in post-war
America. Emerson identified the mounting impact of “industrialization,
urbanization and the proliferation of organization,”212 each, in his view, giving
rise to increasing threats to freedom of expression, which prompted his cautioning
that “the danger of distorting legitimate powers for illegitimate purposes has
become acute.”213 Building on this last point, Emerson noted significant changes
centering on “the impact of mass public opinion.”214 Sounding more like
Herbert Marcuse and the Frankfurt School than a liberal constitutional theorist,
he observed that “[m]odern government strives to achieve unity and control more
by the manipulation of public attitudes and opinion than by direct application of
official sanctions.”215
209. See Sullivan, supra note 4; Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press” (1975) 26 Hastings LJ 631;
Blasi, “Checking,” supra note 7; Anthony Lewis, “Keynote Address: The Right to Scrutinize
Government: Toward a First Amendment Theory of Accountability” (1980) 34 U Miami
L Rev 793; Timothy W Gleason, The Watchdog Concept: The Press and the Courts in
Nineteenth-Century America (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1990).
210. See e.g. Ford v Québec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 712 at 765 [Ford], where Emerson’s
traditional core of justifications was adopted for litigating free expression cases under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See also Stefan Braun, “Freedom of
Expression v. Obscenity Censorship: The Developing Canadian Jurisprudence” (1985-1986)
50 Sask L Rev 39 at 42; Dubick, supra note 111 at 7; Robin Elliot, “The Supreme Court’s
Understanding of the Democratic Self-Government, Advancement of Truth and Knowledge
and Individual Self-Realization Rationales for Protecting Freedom of Expression: Part I –
Taking Stock” (2012) 59 SCLR (2d) 435 at 443.
211. Supra note 204 at 886.
212. Ibid at 901.
213. Ibid at 902.
214. Ibid.
215. Ibid at 903.
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But rather than highlight the institutional press as a countervailing
mechanism, Emerson appealed only to the rule of law and judicial institutions
for “the maintenance of a system of freedom of expression.”216 Therefore, despite
describing concerns that would have prompted Radical Whigs into pleas for
increased press liberty, concerns with democratic accountability were neither
formally embedded in Emerson’s inventory of free expression justifications
nor acknowledged more generally. As demonstrated by the Supreme Court of
Canada,217 unless courts and legislatures are conversant with the checking function
rationale, there is a real risk that Emerson’s inventory of core justifications could
be misinterpreted as a complete code.
D. NECESSITY FOR MULTI-VALUED THEORIZING

Another barrier to democratic theorizing is worth exploring. Following publication
of Emerson’s article, many legal scholars attempted to resolve perceptions of
incoherence in free speech jurisprudence by subsuming traditional justifications
under various single-valued approaches.218 Among the theoretical aspirants were
Meiklejohn’s democratic “self-governance” rationale,219 “self-realization,”220
“participatory democracy,”221 “believing persons,”222 and even an adaptation of
Habermas’s theory of “communicative action.”223 Although not all single-valued
approaches were exclusionary, all necessarily marginalized lower-ranked rationales.
The most marginalized theory was the checking function of the press.
In a controversial 1982 article prophetically titled “The Value of Free Speech,”
216. Ibid.
217. See Ford, supra note 210.
218. See e.g. Robert H Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems” (1971)
47 Ind LJ 1; Lillian R BeVier, “The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry
into the Substance and Limits of Principle” (1978) 30 Stan L Rev 299 [BeVier, “The First
Amendment”]; Lillian R BeVier, “An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search
for a Constitutional Principle” (1980) 68 Cal L Rev 482; Martin H Redish, “The Value
of Free Speech” (1982) 130 U Pa L Rev 591; Michael J Perry, “Freedom of Expression:
An Essay on Theory and Doctrine” (1983) 78 Nw UL Rev 1137; Lawrence B Solum,
“Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech”
(1989) 83 Nw UL Rev 54; Steven D Smith, “Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The
Neglected Center of the First Amendment” (2002) U Ill L Rev 1233; James Weinstein,
“Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine” (2011)
97 Va L Rev 491.
219. Bork, supra note 218; BeVier, “The First Amendment,” supra note 218.
220. Redish, supra note 218; Perry, supra note 218.
221. Weinstein, supra note 218.
222. Smith, supra note 218.
223. Solum, supra note 218.
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Professor Martin Redish argued that Emerson’s classic free expression justifications
were best subsumed under the “one true value” of “individual self-realization.”224
Claiming that Emerson’s justifications were “in reality subvalues of self-realization,”
Redish also targeted multi-valued approaches more generally, insisting that it
was “inaccurate to suggest that ‘the commitment to free expression embodie[s]
a complex of values.’”225 After dismissing Emerson’s core justifications, Redish
observed that “Professor Blasi’s ‘checking function’ appear[ed] strikingly similar
to the ‘democratic process’ value of Meiklejohn.”226 In an instructive case of
misguided reliance on formal logic, Redish dismissed the checking function as
only a derivative of “self-realization,” reasoning incautiously that “[b]ecause the
checking function ultimately derives from the principle of democratic self-rule,
and because that principle in turn follows from the self-realization value, the
checking function is merely one concrete manifestation of the much broader
self-realization value.”227
The difficulties with this overly reductionist, single-valued approach are many.
First, Redish’s interpretation of the checking function was curt and dismissive,
failing to engage with its “constitutive premises” and Blasi’s considerable efforts
to distinguish it from traditional free expression theories.228 Second, Redish
discussed the checking function in highly abstract terms, without scrutinizing
its relationship to particular doctrinal issues, such as its role in public libel
doctrine. Without anchoring his discussion in paradigmatic examples of official
misconduct, it is difficult to appreciate how one might prefer self-realization
or any other free expression justification over the checking function for factual
relevance or exegetical power.
Lastly, Redish’s argument minimized crucial distinctions between democratic
self-governance and the checking function that reveal themselves principally in
the context of public libels. It is precisely the factual details of official misconduct
and abuse of governmental power that ensure an accurate and credible balancing
of free expression against reputation. That is, it matters greatly for selecting
doctrine whether freedom of expression’s side of the equation is properly
weighted. Epistemologically, Redish’s argument races to progressively higher
levels of abstraction at the expense of a sharper and more complete understanding
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
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Ibid at 594, quoting Blasi, “Checking,” supra note 7 at 538.
Ibid at 613, n 77.
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of the checking function’s contextual relevance and distinctive relationship to
democratic theory. Simply put, as with all abstraction, it is in consequence most
notable for what it leaves out.
Professor Michael Perry has also dismissed the checking function by
appealing to a simple criterion of whether a proposed theory adds any “additional
normative content” to freedom of expression.229 In an illustrative example of this
similarly misguided approach, Perry reasoned that since Meiklejohnian theory
“calls for protecting information and ideas useful in evaluating public policy
and performance,”230 information on abuses of authority does not add anything
further. Perry’s dismissal of the checking function is thus comprised of one simple,
highly abstract statement regarding potential overlap of information relevant to
both values. This broad and undifferentiated understanding of Meiklejohnian
theory and the checking function evidences the dangers of disregarding their
differences in emphasis and relevance to specific factual contexts. What Professors
Perry and Redish fail to consider is that the checking function might provide
uniquely sound reasons to weigh freedom of expression more heavily in some
factual contexts than in others, particularly in cases where governments,
politicians, and certain public figures attempt to use defamation law to silence
the press from publishing matters of public interest to mass audiences.
Fortunately, these methodological concerns have attracted other eminent
constitutional law scholars.231 The leading light on such matters is arguably
Professor Frederick Schauer who, in contrast to those crusading for one true
free expression theory, supports a seemingly less splendid multi-valued approach.
Although advising that “[a]ttempting to apply the first amendment without
some theoretical vision of free speech is mere stumbling in the dark,”232 Schauer
cautioned against the pitfalls of the single-valued approaches endorsed by
Professors Redish and Perry, confirming that “it is unlikely that any one theory
229. Supra note 218 at 1159.
230. Ibid at 1152, n 62. For a Canadian example, see David Fewer, “Constitutionalizing
Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55 UT
Fac L Rev 175 at 193-94.
231. See e.g. Frederick Schauer, “Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts”
(1981) 34 Vand L Rev 265 [Schauer, “Categories”]; Frederick Schauer, Free Speech:
A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Pierre J
Schlag, “An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech” (1983) 30 UCLA L
Rev 671; Steven Shiffrin, “Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship” (1983) 30 UCLA
L Rev 1103; Frederick Schauer, “Must Speech be Special?” (1983) 78 Nw UL Rev 1284;
Frederick Schauer, “Public Figures” (1984) 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 905 [Schauer, “Public
Figures”]; Kent Greenawalt, “Free Speech Justifications” (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 119.
232. Schauer, “Categories,” supra note 231 at 291-92, n 124.
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can explain the concept of free speech, and no reason necessarily exists to suppose
that it could.”233 Not long after, Professor Schauer concluded more definitively
that “[t]o view the first amendment as being grounded in one and only one
theoretical justification is a mistake.”234
Columbia Law Professor Kent Greenawalt has also argued that single,
unifying justifications for free expression risk either obscuring or oversimplifying
its interrelated rationales. In “Free Speech Justifications,”235 Greenawalt posited
a loose constellation of reasons, subjects, and sub-principles of free expression.
Explaining the now familiar single-valued strategy of inclusion used by Professor
Redish,236 whereby free expression values are subsumed under a broader theory,
Greenawalt sensibly advised that “any reason broad enough to yield a plausible
claim that it includes everything else is bound to be extremely general and vague.”237
Citing Blasi’s checking value as an instructive example, Greenawalt opposed the
single-valued methodologies of Professors Redish and Perry, advising that “[t]he
value of free speech for accountable government may be underestimated if only
the relationship to individual fulfillment is addressed.”238
An orientation toward practical thought is therefore paramount for
Greenawalt, requiring a more bottom-up and contextual approach to
constitutional theorizing. For example, when considering the checking function
as a free expression value of “historical significance and central importance …
powerfully developed by Vincent Blasi,” Greenawalt observed that it seemed
“[c]losely linked to truth discovery and interests accommodation.”239 However,
demonstrating the power of his prescriptions for preserving the checking function’s
theoretical independence, Greenawalt stressed that “a critical press affects how
officials and citizens regard the exercise of government power, subtly supporting
the notion that government service is a responsibility, not an opportunity for
personal advantage.”240
In the end, given the alarming acts of corruption that too often typify public
libel cases, Professor Greenawalt’s sensitivity to differing emphases of democratic
free expression theories seems a sensible approach worth preserving.
233.
234.
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236.
237.
238.
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240.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFAMATION LAW REFORM
A. THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC LIBEL LAW

This undertheorizing of democratic free expression values has had drastic effects
on public libel jurisprudence. Making matters worse, when it is viewed from
a comparative law perspective, there appears to be no criteria by which judges
and legislators select their doctrinal approaches.241 Other than comprehensively
rejecting the actual malice rule outside America,242 leading courts and legislatures
effectively provide no theoretical justifications for their preferred solutions.243
For example, in Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd,244 a majority
of Australia’s High Court attempted to justify its unprecedented expansion of
qualified privilege principles by concluding imprecisely, “[t]he formula we favour
redresses the balance to some extent in favour of the plaintiff; as much, in our
view, as can legitimately be achieved without significantly interfering with free
communication.”245 Besides dismissing US doctrine, the High Court’s reasons for
judgment omitted any criteria by which this statement could be assessed. Similarly,
the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutional analysis in Grant was contained in
one short paragraph. Clearly preferring a doctrinal middle road bifurcating the
actual malice rule and the defence of qualified privilege, Chief Justice McLachlin
concluded: “In my view, the third option, buttressed by the argument from
Charter principles advanced earlier, represents a reasonable and proportionate
response to the need to protect reputation while sustaining the public exchange
of information that is vital to modern Canadian society.”246 Besides overlooking
the checking function in its “argument from Charter principles,”247 the Court’s
legal analysis also lacked evaluative criteria.
Where theoretical justifications are attempted, judges and legislators have
disregarded accountability and the checking function rationale when appealing
to democratic theory, thus selecting less press-friendly doctrine than required. For
241. Stephenson, supra note 2, ch 1.
242. See generally Mark Tushnet, “New York Times v. Sullivan Around the World” (2014) 66 Ala
L Rev 337. See also Paul Horwitz, “Introduction: Still Learning from New York Times v.
Sullivan” (2014) 66 Ala L Rev 221.
243. See e.g. Theophanous, supra note 4 at 140; Lange v Atkinson & Australian Consolidated Press
NZ Ltd, [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) at 37; Lange, 1998, supra note 4 at 451, 467; Reynolds,
supra note 4 at 203, 204, 210, 219; Grant, supra note 4 at paras 57, 89.
244. Theophanous, supra note 4.
245. Ibid at 140.
246. Grant, supra note 4 at para 86.
247. Ibid.
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instance, in Reynolds,248 the House of Lords rejected a generic qualified privilege
based on the actual malice rule. Lord Nicholls, who wrote the leading speech,
concluded unconvincingly that the newspaper’s attempt to distinguish political
discussion from other matters of public interest was “unsound in principle,”249
and “lack[ed] a coherent rationale.”250 Lord Cooke also asserted that there was “no
good reason” why politicians and public officials should be subjected to greater
risk of false allegations of fact in the media.251 Importantly, these claims were
made without the benefits of comparative law analysis or careful reflections on the
doctrinal implications of pertinent free expression justifications.252 Collectively,
this undertheorizing has led to widespread over- and under-protection of political
speech and expression worldwide.253
The effects of these errors intensify when a revised theoretical framework is
offered for consideration. As I have proposed, by adjusting public libel doctrine
(i.e., press regulation) to a jurisdiction’s background accountability profile, law
reform efforts must focus on assessing the cumulative effects of eight accountability
mechanisms.254 Rather than adjusting public libel doctrine linearly to only one
variable (e.g., reputation), doctrine is selected to mitigate exposed “accountability
dysfunctions,” be they deficits or overloads.255 This requires evaluating
accountability networks from a systems perspective, essentially adjusting the
press’s checking function to restore an optimal balance of accountability in
each jurisdiction.
This is perhaps best grasped by applying this proposed framework to the
United Kingdom, where it generates unexpected, but theoretically sound, reforms.
As detailed elsewhere,256 despite the additional sources of information generated
248.
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by its mechanisms of legislative scrutiny (i.e., official reports, departmental
select committees, and constituency opinion polling), Britain remains beset by
widespread transparency concerns associated with its parliamentary structure and
its convention of ministerial responsibility.257 To be exact, parliamentary systems
lack the monitoring capacity of their presidential counterparts, a concern that
is only exacerbated by their system of ministerial responsibility, which increases
the probability that important policy making takes place “behind closed
doors.”258 In addition, owing to restrictions on citizen access to the Parliamentary
Ombudsman, and the substantial number of exemptions undermining access to
information under Britain’s freedom of information legislation, there remains
considerable need for supplemental accountability mechanisms to mitigate these
transparency concerns.259
Given this accountability “deficit,” the most appropriate doctrinal approach
for the United Kingdom is arguably a generic privilege similar to the actual malice
rule.260 Alternatively, Britain’s new statutory defence of “Publication on Matter
of Public Interest” can be adapted by adding presumptions of “public interest”
and “reasonable belief ” rebuttable on “clear and convincing” evidence to the
contrary.261 Crucially, both doctrinal options provide more direct assurances for
media defendants by triggering enhanced doctrinal protection to generate and
report on accountability news when the subjects of their publications engage
pivotal accountability concerns characteristic of the checking function rationale.262
In the end, regardless of the approach taken, the problem of public libel law
highlights the importance of achieving sound doctrine by exposing underlying
problems obscured by differences in legal doctrine and technique, and by
identifying and repairing significant disruptions in the theory−doctrine interface.
B. FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CANADIAN DEFAMATION LAW REFORM

Besides illuminating the disruptive effects of democratic undertheorizing on
public libel law, our enquiry yields five recommendations for contemporary
defamation law reforms.
257. Ibid at 220.
258. Kaare Strøm, “Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation” in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C
Müller & Torbjörn Bergman, eds, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 96. See also Kaare Strøm, “Delegation
and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies” (2000) 37 European J of Political
Research 261 at 274.
259. Stephenson, supra note 2 at 220.
260. Ibid at 223-24.
261. Ibid at 224.
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54

(2018) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

1.

NO ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL SOLUTIONS

First, as evidenced by the problem of public libel law, doctrine must be adapted
to different libel plaintiffs and to a jurisdiction’s distinctive institutional
context. A one-size-fits-all approach is thus unacceptable since it presupposes
a false-to-facts identity of structure and accountability dynamics across
jurisdictions. For instance, since libel plaintiffs such as governments, politicians,
and influential public figures and corporations similarly threaten democratic
legitimacy, applying the checking function rationale prima facie maximizes the
selection of doctrine most conducive to generating and reporting accountability
news. However, this is not the end of the analysis. Appropriate doctrine must
ultimately be attained using a broader framework that gauges a jurisdiction’s actual
accountability profile, which may require further doctrinal adjustment. With so
many independent variables to assess, a single solution is highly improbable, not
only between jurisdictions, but within single jurisdictions where libel plaintiffs
elicit more or less concern with political and public misconduct.
A one-size-fits-all approach is also inconsistent with recent advances in First
Amendment scholarship that place renewed emphasis upon institutions and how
they affect First Amendment jurisprudence.263 Arguing that First Amendment
law is in crisis, Paul Horwitz’s structural institutionalism moves beyond the
conventional application of acontextual rules and principles toward alternatives
rooted in contextual realities and the unique characteristics of institutional actors.
Besides being responsive to institutional context and changing social realities,
as in public libel jurisprudence, Professor Horwitz insists that free speech
principles should be developed more empirically from the bottom up.
Finally, due to our increased capacity for adapting doctrine to a jurisdiction’s
institutional milieu, a contextually sensitive approach provides a much more
promising basis for regulating the intricacies of global defamation regimes than
imposing uniform doctrine across different forms of representative democracy.264
2.

IMPORTANCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW METHODOLOGY

A second recommendation is to recognize the importance of comparative law
analysis, especially for diagnosing underlying problems that technical differences
in legal doctrine routinely obscure. As evidenced by public libel jurisprudence,
263. See Paul Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 2013).
264. See e.g. Lee C Bollinger, Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open: A Free Press for a New Century
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) ch 3.
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it is only by adopting a comparative law perspective that the veiled issue of a
missing selection theory emerges. That is, a homespun lawyer will not easily
discern that significant problems exist with domestic public libel doctrine by
examining their law in isolation. Rather, any underlying issues are best exposed
by comparing one’s domestic law with approaches from other jurisdictions. In the
end, increasing our comparative law awareness reduces risks that our domestic
laws fail to reflect our constitutional values and institutional dynamics.
Similarly, given the increasing challenges of the Internet to defamation law in
general, one would expect that our law making would only improve by avoiding
domestic exceptionalism and seeking to understand how other nations attempt to
solve similar problems through variations in libel doctrine and technique. In the
end, comparative law research not only tests the soundness and efficacy of our
existing laws, but also guides our reforms with upmost insight and precision.265
3.

RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Third, it is long overdue that the checking function rationale be added to
Canada’s inventory of free expression justifications. As we have seen, Canada’s
current triumvirate of free expression values owes its origins to the incorporation
of Professor Emerson’s core justifications in Ford v Québec (Attorney General).266
Since Emerson’s model did not specify or contain the checking function rationale,
it was not picked up by the Court, leaving Canadian courts little choice but to
shoehorn accountability concerns into less relevant theoretical rationales, most
commonly the truth-seeking justification.
Moreover, given the importance of defamation principles to regulating press
freedom, the problem of public libel law has shown that our ability to accurately
balance free expression and reputation is impaired without a democratic model
that highlights accountability concerns and the checking function of the press.
Importantly, while accountability concerns persist regardless of whether false
defamatory statements of fact are widely published in print or online forms,
there is an increasing danger that, without a democratic free expression theory
resonant with the checking function rationale, the ever-increasing speed and
reach of digital publications will dominate the process of doctrine selection out of
singular concern with technology’s detrimental effects on reputational interests.

265. See Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed translated by
Tony Weir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
266. Ford, supra note 210 at 764-65.
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4.

IDENTIFYING AND APPLYING ALL RELEVANT FREE EXPRESSION
JUSTIFICATIONS

A fourth recommendation based on our enquiry into public libel law’s
undertheorizing dilemma is that regardless of the doctrinal approach adopted
by courts and legislatures (i.e., ad hoc balancing, categoricalism), all relevant
free expression justifications must be identified, tabled, and overcome. This
is particularly important where doctrinal alternatives involve the balancing
of competing rights, interests, and values. As seen in the context of public
libel law, any significant disjunction between defamation principles and free
expression theory compromises the delicate balancing of freedom of expression
against reputation. This inevitably produces arbitrary doctrine, which prevents
tailoring defamation principles to reflect specific institutional contexts and
jurisdictional values.
Another way to put this is to insist upon the most robust theory−doctrine
interface. Why do we care? What are the underlying regulatory objectives? What
are we trying to achieve? And which of our free expression justifications is most
relevant? Again, in the context of public libel law, at stake was not simply whether
we obtained the right balance between freedom of expression and reputation,
but whether we had exposed the underlying problem that the contrasting
technicalities of public libel doctrine were obscuring. This turned out to be the
difficulty of tailoring press regulation to a jurisdiction’s distinct accountability
profile. In the end, the degree to which we have carefully thought about the
theory−doctrine interface can drastically affect the nature of the regulatory
problems being identified and solved.
5.

LAW IN CONTEXT

Finally, as evidenced by the problem of public libel law, contextual factors such
as the rise of digital surveillance and the ongoing crisis of journalism contribute
immensely to accountability dynamics and future law reform requirements. For
instance, several academic disciplines have reported that over the last twenty
years, traditional models of journalism have experienced a global crisis, witnessing
massively reduced circulation and advertising revenues, record lay-offs of
journalists and reporters, the near elimination of investigative reporting, science
journalism, and local news coverage, and a concomitant rise in government public
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relations.267 Despite threatening the generation and reporting of accountability
news and the constitutional role of the press,268 a primary implication of these
developments is that they oblige law reform authorities to consider more liberal
public libel doctrine than might otherwise have seemed appropriate. This broader
perspective also ties back to the value of comparative analysis and maintaining
a vigilant approach to the theory−doctrine interface. At last, developing a keen
awareness for how legal problems exist in socio-political spaces not only enhances
our understanding of their complex etiology, but also mitigates against inaccurate
diagnoses and prescriptive reforms.

IV. CONCLUSION
As our examination of the problem of public libel law demonstrates, our ability
to diagnose and understand contemporary problems falters when we encounter
breakdowns in the theory−doctrine interface.269 In the case of public libel
jurisprudence, the underlying problem involved a widespread and pervasive
disregard of democratic accountability concerns and the checking function
of the press. Part I demonstrates that as between Meiklejohn’s self-governance
theory and Blasi’s checking value of the press, Britain’s Radical Whigs and
Commonwealthmen almost exclusively emphasized and developed concerns
resonant with the checking function rationale. As our survey of British and
American libertarian thought exposes, somewhere between the emergence of
British parliamentarism and contemporary defamation law reforms, we appear to
have forgotten the importance of democratic accountability and guarding against
new and ever-encroaching threats to political liberty that our eighteenth-century
predecessors understood and recorded perhaps better than at any other time.
Part II supports these observations by demonstrating that Meiklejohn
and Blasi emphasized different aspects of democratic theory that support
fundamentally different conceptions of the press. It also shows that difficulties
marshalling democratic theory are due (at least partially) both to incomplete
267. See e.g. Eric CC Chang, Miriam A Golding & Seth J Hill, “Legislative Malfeasance and
Political Accountability” (2010) 62 World Politics 177; Robert W McChesney & John
Nichols, The Death and Life of American Journalism: The Media Revolution That Will Begin the
World Again (Philadelphia: Nation Books, 2010); David AL Levy & Rasmus Kleis Nielsen,
eds, The Changing Business of Journalism and Its Implications for Democracy (Oxford: Reuters
Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2010).
268. See Alex S Jones, Losing the News: The Future of the News that Feeds Democracy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009).
269. See Beckton, supra note 111 at 584.
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articulations of freedom of expression’s core justifications, and misguided
attempts to subsume traditional rationales under single-valued approaches. Both
have disproportionately marginalized the checking function of the press, which
remains the free expression value most relevant to adjudicating public libel cases
and strengthening accountability in representative systems.
Finally, Part III reveals five lessons as we engage with the difficult but
important task of assessing the Internet’s impact on defamation law. Besides
endorsing advances in our jurisdictional, contextual, and institutional awareness
of modern-day legal problems, the specific problem of public libel law reminds
us that, even in cases most fundamental to a democratic society, where our
defamation laws must carefully balance political criticism against personal
character and reputation, we promote arbitrary doctrine at odds with our most
fundamental political values. As we have seen, our strongest guarantee of sound
defamation doctrine depends upon ensuring a complete inventory of fully
articulated free expression justifications carefully applied to relevant issues and
disputes. The effects of the Internet, however measured, cannot sidestep this
basic requirement.

